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A B S T R A C T
This article demonstrates that public attitudes towards EU
enlargement are strongly affected by exposure to the mass
media. It reveals ‘priming’ effects by showing that media
exposure affects the standards by which individuals evalu-
ate the accession of potential candidate countries. To gain a
more refined understanding about media effects on enlarge-
ment attitudes, we analytically separate three different
factors that underlie EU enlargement support for a given
candidate country: its economic performance, its state of
democracy and its perceived cultural ‘match’ with the EU.
Employing an experimental design, we probe the media-
induced effects of these factors on EU enlargement attitudes.
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Introduction
The accession of Bulgaria and Romania has not put an end to the enlarge-
ment agenda of the European Union (EU). Croatia, the Former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia and Turkey are three candidate countries already on
the (bumpy) road to accession. In the Western Balkans, Albania, Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Montenegro and Serbia are classified by the EU as ‘potential
candidate countries’. Furthermore, for countries in the EU’s ‘neighbourhood’,
such as Moldova or Ukraine, EU accession in the medium to long run is not
out of the question.
The recent enlargement rounds have sparked a broader debate in the
media as well as in academia about the EU’s (ultimate) boundaries (see,
among others, Flora, 2000; Gerhards, 2005; Zielonka, 2005). The discussion
about the possible accession of Turkey to the EU is a case in point. Yet we
know very little about the conditions under which EU member states support
or oppose enlargement to a particular applicant state (see Schimmelfennig
and Sedelmeier, 2005: 6, 21). Thus, the more countries accede to the EU, the
more pressing is the question about ‘where to draw the line’. What prompts
EU member states to ‘shift’ the EU’s geographical border?
The EU enlargement literature is strongly centred on elite politics and
preferences and has only recently begun to explore public attitudes towards
enlargement either in the EU member states (see e.g. Jones and van der Bijl,
2004; Karp and Bowler, 2006; McLaren, 2007) or in accession countries (see
e.g. Vetik et al., 2006). Yet, in order to address the question about the borders
of the EU, exploring the determinants of public attitudes towards EU enlarge-
ment is essential. In light of the evaporating ‘permissive consensus’ (Lindberg
and Scheingold, 1970) – which has been identified for some time (see e.g. Reif,
1993; Hooghe and Marks, 2006) – the political relevance of public opinion for
the future of European integration is likely to be paramount, a fact that was
forcefully demonstrated by the double rejection of the Constitutional Treaty
by referendum in two of the ‘founding states’, France and the Netherlands.
Since leading politicians across different EU member states have pledged 
to make EU accession of current candidate countries conditional upon a
positive referendum outcome in the home country, most EU member states,
especially those intending to ask the public about the issue (e.g. Denmark,
Sweden and the UK), delayed the ratification process. Moreover, in 2006 the
plans for a Constitutional Treaty were officially put on hold by the European
Council. Hence, public attitudes towards EU integration in general, and EU
enlargement in particular, play an increasingly important role in the enlarge-
ment decision process, which has hitherto been dominated by political elites
in the national capitals.
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In order to explain public support for the EU and European integration,
the literature emphasizes two types of determinants. According to the first
perspective, citizens base their support on an evaluation of the economic
consequences of EU membership. Support for integration thus stems from
individual cost/benefit calculations. Those who perceive more advantages
than disadvantages – either for their own ‘pocket book’ or for the national
economy – are more likely to support European integration than are those
who expect integration to offer a negative cost/benefit balance (see e.g.
Hooghe and Marks, 2005: 420–2; Kaltenthaler and Anderson, 2001: 144). In
fact, numerous studies show that macroeconomic conditions have a signifi-
cant impact on EU support levels (see e.g. Anderson and Reichert, 1996;
Eichenberg and Dalton, 1993; Gabel, 1998a, 1998b, 1998c; Gabel and Palmer,
1995; Sánchez-Cuenca, 2000). According to the second perspective, support
for European integration is conditioned by citizens’ affective relationship
with their nation-state as well as their orientation towards the EU (see 
e.g. Kaltenthaler and Anderson, 2001). There is ample evidence that the level
of support for the EU and the European integration process depends on
individual attitudes towards one’s nation, the level of support for vertical
integration (i.e. to support the transfer of sovereignty from national to EU
level) and more general experiences of the EU (see e.g. Eichenberg and
Dalton, 1993; Franklin et al., 1994; Inglehart, 1977; Martinotti and Steffanizzi,
1995; Shepherd, 1975). However, the direction of the impact on EU support
levels is not always clear cut. For instance, the relationship between 
national identity and support for European integration can pull in opposite
directions: on the one hand, national identity and European integration can
be reinforcing; on the other hand, national identity can also undermine
support for European integration (see Hooghe and Marks, 2004; Risse, 2003,
for an overview).
With few exceptions the literature on public opinion and EU integration
has thus far neglected the role of media effects on attitudes towards European
integration. This is striking, since ordinary citizens usually do not have ‘first-
hand’ experience of the EU, but depend on mass media coverage for infor-
mation. This holds especially true for those levels of the political system that
are perceived as ‘far away’ from everyday life – first and foremost national
politics as well as supranational politics (see Norris, 2000). Even though the
public opinion literature increasingly acknowledges the relevance of ‘cues’ in
activating or priming citizens’ underlying interest in and valuing of EU
integration (see Hooghe and Marks, 2005; Steenbergen et al., 2007), the linkages
between ‘cue-givers’, such as political parties, political leaders and insti-
tutions, and the ‘cue-recipients’ remain largely under-explored (see Carey and
Burton, 2004, for an exception). These linkages are provided by the mass
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media. As we will demonstrate below, the mass media have a significant effect
on attitudes towards enlargement.
Public opinion and EU enlargement
The literature on public opinion and EU enlargement takes the two
‘traditional’ explanatory routes mentioned above as points of departure,
emphasizing the economic costs and benefits of enlargement as well as the
affective relationship with one’s own country and the EU. In one of the first
applications of the EU-related public opinion literature concerning the
question of enlargement attitudes, Karp and Bowler (2006) advance three sets
of arguments – pertaining to respondents’ identification with the EU, the costs
and benefits of EU membership and satisfaction with the EU institutions – in
order to explain public attitudes towards EU enlargement. Although Karp
and Bowler (2006) find evidence for all three types of argument, they demon-
strate that instrumental self-interest is the most powerful predictor for
explaining attitudes towards EU enlargement.
Jones and van der Bijl (2004) present a transaction-affinities approach to
explain public support for EU enlargement. Employing aggregate national
response data from Eurobarometer, they explore ‘whether the level of trans-
actions between existing member states and specific candidate countries can
explain support in the member states for the accession . . . of specific candi-
date countries’ (Jones and van der Bijl, 2004: 334). The study finds that trading
relationships between ‘old’ member states and accession countries and
geographical proximity are the driving factors explaining levels of support.
Jones and van der Bijl (2004: 347) also demonstrate that ‘policy-relevant
concerns – specifically in relation to agriculture’ – have an impact on aggre-
gate response rates. These findings are in line with the ‘instrumentalist’
argument whereby respondents weigh the expected costs and benefits of
enlargement. Yet the study also shows that identity-related factors (historic
relationships between countries) as well as cultural aspects (Catholicism)
feature in explaining aggregate national support for EU enlargement.
In a recent study on public attitudes towards Turkish EU membership,
McLaren (2007) advances different theoretical arguments to explain variation
in citizens’ levels of support for Turkish EU membership in different EU
member states. One line of argumentation echoes previous studies by refer-
ring to respondents’ economic self-interest as a determinant of attitudes
towards Turkish membership. McLaren also introduces into the debate a
novel identity-related argument that emphasizes group interests. She argues
that ‘explanations for differences in opinion about Turkish candidacy are
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likely to relate to out-group rejection and its counterpart, in-group identity
and protectiveness’ (McLaren, 2007: 257; see also McLaren, 2002; De Vreese
and Boomgaarden, 2005). In-group and out-group sentiments are connected
to the resources possessed by a group, such as jobs and social security benefits,
as well as cultural factors, such as symbols, myths and traditions (see
McLaren, 2007: 257). Consequently, McLaren argues that both threats to
resources and threats to culture should condition public attitudes towards
Turkish membership.
Even though the reviewed literature has considerably improved our
knowledge about the determinants of mass attitudes towards EU enlarge-
ment, Hooghe and Marks (2005) identify one general shortcoming in the
existing literature on public attitudes towards the EU. They argue that, in
order to become politically salient, the factors ‘explaining’ mass attitudes
towards integration or enlargement need to be ‘primed’ (Hooghe and Marks,
2005: 424). Cue theory draws from cognitive and social psychology and
examines ‘how political cues – grounded in ideology or in elite communi-
cation – mediate the effect of economic calculation and community member-
ship’ (Hooghe and Marks, 2005: 420). It has been demonstrated that ideology
and domestic political institutions, first and foremost political parties, shape
and frame attitudes to European integration. According to Hooghe and Marks
(2005: 425), ‘public opinion is constrained by political ideology, political
parties, and political elites in . . . domestic arenas’. Carey and Burton (2004)
have advanced a similar argument. They rightly claim that existing studies
exploring the determinants of public attitudes towards the EU commonly
assume that expectations about the expected costs and benefits of EU inte-
gration are formed by ‘cues’, i.e. they ‘filter through individuals through
media, parties, trade unions, personal contacts, and so on, although these
links are not directly investigated’ (Carey and Burton, 2004: 638).
The missing link: Media effects and public opinion
It is obvious that the vast majority of citizens have no first-hand experience
of politics, whether domestic, European or international. Consequently,
citizens rely on the mass media to obtain information about political issues.
But how do the mass media affect political attitudes? Research on political
communication commonly employs three major processes in relation to
attitude formation and change: agenda-setting, priming and framing (see
Scheufele and Tewksbury, 2007, as well as Semetko, 2004, for overviews). The
focus of this article is on framing and priming processes. According to
framing theory, the characterization of an issue, an event or an actor by the
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media influences the audience’s understanding of the subject. At the macro
level, framing refers to the modes journalists choose to present complex infor-
mation in a practical way (‘media frames’). By emphasizing certain aspects
of an object while neglecting or suppressing others, particular issues are
made ‘more salient through different modes of presentation’ (Scheufele and
Tewksbury, 2007: 15). If those presentations match the often rather simple
schemes people use for information-processing (so-called ‘audience frames’),
media frames can influence orientations at the micro level, i.e. the individ-
ual perceptions of a particular object as well as attitudes toward an object.
Through framing, the mass media highlight special aspects or attributes
of an issue or object, thereby shaping its image. By framing information, the
media are able to initiate priming processes at the micro level, thereby influ-
encing the standards by which individuals evaluate objects or issues (Iyengar
and Kinder, 1987: 63). The media have the power to shift those standards
because individuals predominantly utilize information that has been most
recently ‘activated’ and is therefore at the ‘top of their heads’ instead of
employing the full range of cognitively available information to evaluate
objects (Zaller, 1992: 48). As a result, the media tell citizens not only what to
think about but also how to think about an issue or object.
The analysis of media effects on public opinion about the EU is an
embryonic field of study. Most recently, De Vreese and Boomgaarden (2006:
421) note that it is ‘striking that the relationship between media and public
opinion on European integration . . . has remained so underdeveloped in the
scientific literature’. This is even more surprising, considering that ‘the vast
majority of citizens across Europe repeatedly identify news media as their
most important and preferred source of information about European inte-
gration’ (De Vreese and Boomgaarden, 2006: 421).
With regard to the study of EU enlargement, there are presently two
studies that explicitly address the question of how the media affect EU enlarge-
ment attitudes. In their pioneering study, De Vreese and Boomgaarden (2006)
demonstrate that public attitudes about EU enlargement are conditioned 
by media coverage and, more particularly, by its evaluative content and the
direction of this content, i.e. whether evaluations of EU enlargement are
portrayed positively, negatively or mixed:
where the news media coverage was considerable in amount and positive in tone
we found respondents . . . to be gain-seeking and endorse the enlargement of the
EU. In the situation where news media messages were less visible and mixed in
character we did not find the news media to exert an influence on the dynamics
of public opinion formation. (De Vreese and Boomgaarden, 2006: 430)
Schuck and De Vreese (2006) employ evaluations of EU enlargement in terms
of risks and opportunities as ‘valence frames’ in order to assess the influence
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of these frames on public support for EU enlargement. Using a multi-method
design – their study employs both content analysis and experimental data –
Schuck and De Vreese (2006: 21) find the ‘risk frame’ leads to lower levels of
support for EU enlargement among respondents than the ‘opportunity
frame’.
Explaining EU enlargement attitudes
The use of valence frames has improved our understanding of media effects
on enlargement attitudes, but we propose to employ a more differentiated set
of frames. Instead of exclusively focusing on the effects of ‘positive’ and
‘negative’ issue-framing associated with EU enlargement, we argue that we
are potentially losing a lot of information about the determinants of enlarge-
ment attitudes and the role of media effects through this form of issue amal-
gamation. By studying the effects of positive and negative evaluation of
different sets of determinants to explain EU enlargement attitudes, we expect
to gain a more refined understanding of the variable strength of media effects.
Following the public opinion literature discussed in the previous section,
we assume that respondents’ enlargement attitudes respond to different
evaluations of socioeconomic as well as identity-related issues. With regard
to socioeconomic issues, we argue that positive evaluations of a candidate
country’s economy and expected positive economic externalities of accession
for the existing member states will have a positive effect on respondents’ level
of support. Conversely, when these evaluations are framed negatively, i.e.
where the economic externalities of membership are considered to be negative
and economic performance poor, we expect a negative effect on respondents’
enlargement attitudes.
In the context of EU enlargement, identity-related issues matter for the
construction of an ‘in-group’ and an ‘out-group’ or of a notion of ‘us’ versus
‘them’ (see McLaren, 2007). These intersubjective constructions lend them-
selves to the formation of symbolic boundaries, i.e. ‘conceptual distinctions
made by social actors to categorize objects, people, practices, and even time
and space. They are tools by which individuals and groups struggle over and
come to agree upon definitions of reality’ (Lamont and Molnar, 2002: 168).
Symbolic boundaries promote identification with an in-group by generating
feelings of similarity and group membership. Symbolic boundaries are distinct
from social or political boundaries: whereas the latter manifest themselves as
groupings of individuals and holders of entitlements (such as citizenship
rights), symbolic boundaries are established and sustained intersubjectively.
Yet both types of boundaries ‘should be viewed as equally real’. At 
the causal level, symbolic boundaries can be thought of as a necessary but
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insufficient condition for the existence of social boundaries’ (Lamont and
Molnar, 2002: 169). By analysing the effect of identity-related issues on EU
enlargement attitudes, we follow an important line of enquiry in order to
assess the EU’s symbolic boundaries.
How do we go about exploring the impact of identity-related issues on
enlargement attitudes? Most indicators employed in research tapping the
level of EU identity in public opinion have one fundamental shortcoming
concerning issue amalgamation. We agree with Bruter (2003) that Euro-
barometer offers poor indicators and data to tap European identity. He
argues that ‘[w]hen two individuals claim to “feel European,” they might
mean totally different things in terms of both the intensity of the feeling they
describe and the imagined political community they refer to’ (Bruter, 2003:
1154). Taking recourse to the literature on identity-formation, we distinguish
two approaches to explore European identity in order to gain a better under-
standing of ‘what people mean when they claim to feel European or not’
(Bruter, 2003: 1154).
First, essentialist theories of identity-formation place a strong emphasis
on ‘cultural background variables’ (Cederman, 2001: 10). Essentialism is most
commonly associated with the theory of ethno-nationalism. From this
perspective, the nation-state continues to exercise a strong emotional pull
based on common memories and common understandings of tradition,
religion and culture (see Cederman, 2001: 14). Even though essentialism
carries a strong connotation with nationalism, it is possible to conceptualize
culture-driven processes of identity-formation with regard to non-nation-
based political communities. A European identity based on culture ‘is best
described as individuals’ perceptions that fellow Europeans are closer to them
than non-Europeans’ (Bruter, 2003: 1155). The bonds that hold a culture-based
political community together ‘include any form of common history; moral,
religious, or ethnic traditions; philosophical, political, and moral norms and
values’ (Bruter, 2003: 1156). From the essentialist perspective, European
identity can be conceived in pan-nationalist terms, i.e. an identity shared by
fellow Europeans forming a distinct civilization with its own history, culture,
tradition and religion (Cederman, 2001: 15–16; Huntington, 1996).
Second, constructivist theories of identity-formation start from the
assumption that politics – not culture – is the driving force behind identity-
formation. From this perspective, culture-based nationalism is a modern,
‘historically contingent . . . political principle’, which can be replaced by a
‘thin’ political culture that lends itself to the formation of what Habermas
has labelled ‘constitutional patriotism’ (Cederman, 2001: 15; Habermas,
1992). From this post-nationalist perspective, cultural differences and 
national attachments, although ‘real’ because they are shared and agreed
European Union Politics 9(2)2 5 0
upon intersubjectively, can be superseded and eventually replaced by a civic
identity that is characterized by the degree to which individuals ‘feel that
they are citizens of a European political system, whose rules, laws, and rights
have an influence on their daily life’ (Bruter, 2003: 1155). With regard to civic
identity, we expect that exposure to positive evaluations of the political
system of a candidate country, such as its democratic performance, im-
plementation of the rule of law and human rights standards, will have a
positive effect on respondents’ expression of support for EU accession (and
vice versa). As for cultural identity, we expect that respondents who are
exposed to positive evaluations of a candidate country’s identification with
Europe, as well as to reference to shared traditions and values, are likely to
be influenced positively with regard to enlargement support (and vice versa).
Based on the triple distinction between socioeconomic interests and cultural
and civic components of respondents’ identities, we expect to tap more fine-
grained differences in EU enlargement attitudes than are provided in the
existing literature.
In sum, this article explores three interrelated propositions, which will be
tested in the empirical section. First, we posit that media reception affects the
attitudes of respondents towards the EU accession of Macedonia. Second, we
hypothesize that positive information about Macedonia’s economy, state of
democracy and ‘cultural match’ with the EU affects respondents’ attitudes
towards Macedonian EU accession positively, and vice versa. Third, we
hypothesize that media exposure affects the standards by which respondents
evaluate the issue of Macedonian EU accession (priming). By providing infor-
mation about a specific aspect of current developments in Macedonia (i.e.
Macedonia’s economy, culture and state of democracy), this information
should be more important than other criteria in explaining individual support
for the EU accession of Macedonia.
Method and design
This article builds and expands on existing research in the field of media
effects and public opinion in the EU. It does so by analysing how media
exposure affects public attitudes to EU enlargement and by uncovering the
priming processes through which the standards employed by respondents for
evaluating EU membership of neighbouring countries are altered.
The experimental approach taken in this article differs from existing
research in this field. First, studies employing media effects usually link
survey data on media exposure to mass attitudes or match survey data with
data gained from content analysis. The measured impact of media reporting
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on political attitudes is usually very small and often even insignificant, which
is attributable to the methodology (see Zaller, 1992; Price and Zaller, 1993).
Second, this article seeks to establish the causality between media effects and
respondents’ enlargement attitudes by focusing on priming processes.
Although panel survey designs probe the impact of media coverage on
support for EU enlargement, they establish an indication but not a proof of
causality (see De Vreese and Boomgaarden, 2006). This proof can be
established only by non ex post facto research designs, i.e. experimental
designs (see e.g. Behnke et al., 2006: 81).
This study sets up a three-factor experimental pre-test/post-test design
to make within- and between-condition comparisons in order to answer the
question of whether and how media exposure affects the different standards
– economic, political and cultural – through which respondents assess EU
enlargement to neighbouring countries. The experiment was conducted at the
Faculty of Social Sciences at the University of Kaiserslautern in an under-
graduate lecture course. The pre-test was carried out in December 2006. The
students completed a questionnaire comprising a wide range of questions on
attitudes towards European integration and EU enlargement. The post-test
was carried out six weeks later in January 2007. In total, 95 students partici-
pated in both the pre-test and the post-test.1 The respondents were not
informed about the actual purpose of the study, they were not told that the
first questionnaire would be followed up by a second survey, and we opted
for a time lag of six weeks between the pre-test and the post-test to limit the
problem of panel sensitization. One problem that potentially arises with 
pre-test/post-test designs is that media use in the interim period may have
enhanced or mitigated some of the observed effects. Unfortunately, in the
context of this study, we have no information on the media use of our
respondents.
During the post-test phase, all participants were randomly assigned to
one of seven groups (six experimental groups and one control group). Follow-
ing a randomization check, we found that the groups did not differ signifi-
cantly in terms of their social and political composition. Each respondent from
the seven groups read a copy of a newspaper article. In the case of the six
experimental groups, these entirely fictitious articles raised the issue that
Macedonia might shortly start negotiations to join the EU. Macedonia (and
not another actual or potential candidate country) was selected in order to
stimulate reactions to media content for several reasons: we opted for a
country for which levels of prior knowledge were rather low. Low levels of
prior knowledge as well as the absence of reliable heuristics are preconditions
to create credible experimental conditions. A number of countries do not meet
these criteria because respondents have ample first-hand experience either as
a result of a country’s geographical proximity to Germany (e.g. Switzerland),
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or because respondents have been exposed to media coverage about a particu-
lar country in the recent past (e.g. Turkey), or because they can make educated
guesses about a country’s economic situation, its democratic standards and
its cultural values (e.g. Norway, Iceland). Macedonia meets these pre-
conditions. Based on our measurement of factual knowledge in the post-test,
only 6% of the sample were able to name the capital of Macedonia. In
addition, only 40% knew one of Macedonia’s neighbouring countries.
Combining the answers to the two factual questions, it turned out that 59%
had no knowledge about Macedonia at all.
Taking into account the three potential determinants of EU enlargement,
we designed pairs of newspaper articles that addressed (1) the state of 
Macedonia’s economy and trade relations, (2) the development of Macedon-
ian democracy and rule of law, and (3) the cultural ‘match’ between
Macedonia and current EU member states. For each of these three conditions,
one article framed the issue negatively, the other positively.2 The control
group was asked to read a non-fictitious newspaper article that made no
reference to Macedonia, the EU or the European integration process.3 After
reading the articles, the students were asked to complete a second question-
naire, which included most of the questions asked in the first wave. In order
to ensure that our respondents paid attention to the three factors that we
included in our stimulus material and understood their messages, the
manipulated newspaper articles offered ample verbal references to
Macedonia’s economy, democracy and culture. These terms appeared in the
subheadings of the respective articles as well as in the body text. During
debriefing, we discussed the articles and asked questions about what our
respondents had read and understood.
In order to measure the impact of mass media content on attitudes
towards EU enlargement, we compared support for the EU membership of
Macedonia expressed in the pre-test and the post-test (our dependent
variable4) using a t-test for dependent samples and ANOVA techniques,
respectively. To analyse the priming effects induced by the different news-
paper articles, we related the level of support for Macedonia’s EU member-
ship to the evaluation of its economy, democracy and culture (our
independent variables5) in both the pre-test and the post-test employing
ordinary least squares (OLS) regression.
Results
Our findings offer support for the literature on media effects on attitudes
towards EU enlargement (De Vreese and Boomgaarden, 2006; Schuck and 
De Vreese, 2006). The data analysis shows that exposure to the mass media
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has an impact on support for Macedonia’s accession to the EU (see Table 1).
Respondents exposed to newspaper articles emphasizing that Macedonia’s
economy performs well, that democracy and the rule of law are firmly
enshrined and that cultural values match those of the current EU member
states display a significant increase in their support for Macedonian EU
membership: the sceptical attitude vis-à-vis Macedonia’s membership that we
observed in the pre-test is replaced by a positive attitude in the post-test. In
contrast, exposure to negative press reports across the three dimensions –
economics, democracy and culture – leads to a significant decline in support:
the level of opposition from the pre-test intensified in the post-test. As
expected, the opinions of the control group did not change significantly.
The consequences of exposing respondents to different tones of media
coverage are striking. Analysing the differences in support levels of the three
different groups – respondents exposed to positive articles, respondents
exposed to negative articles, and the control group – we obtain an un-
equivocal message: whereas the respondents’ attitudes on Macedonia’s
accession to the EU are negative (on average) in the pre-test – with the differ-
ences between the groups not reaching levels of statistical significance – this
picture changes dramatically in the post-test. Our media stimulus polarized
individual attitudes on the issue of accession. This polarization, i.e. the scope
and direction of attitude change between the pre-test and the post-test, is
pronounced: the experimental groups differed significantly in their views on
whether or not to admit Macedonia to the EU between the pre-test and the
post-test.
Furthermore, it turns out that, independently of the issue dimension
addressed in the press reports (economy, democracy, culture), negative infor-
mation always leads to a decline in support for Macedonian EU accession
(see Table 2). This finding strongly supports the studies carried out by De
Vreese and Boomgaarden (2006) and Schuck and De Vreese (2006). In the case
of our culture variable, the decline in support is statistically significant. In
contrast, positive press reports generally resulted in an increase in support
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Table 1 Impact of positive and negative press reports about Macedonia on attitudes
towards Macedonian EU membership
Pre-test Post-test Difference p (t-test) N
Article: positive –.38 .10 .49 < .01 39
Article: negative –.29 –.67 –.38 < .05 45
Control group –.18 –.36 –.18 > .05 11
p (analysis of variance) > .05 < .01 < .01
for Macedonian EU membership. The only exception is the group exposed to
information about a cultural match between the EU and Macedonia; here we
recorded no change in attitudes. This does not mean, however, that the indi-
viduals assigned to this group did not change their opinions about this issue.
In fact, they did: the correlation between attitudes in the pre-test and the post-
test is only r = .59. Obviously, these changes are not systematically related
to the information provided in the press reports.
Shifting from evaluative tone to content, i.e. probing for the impact of
factors relating to Macedonia’s economy, democracy and culture, we again
find that mass media coverage polarizes attitudes. Analysing the variance in
attitudes towards the EU membership of Macedonia among our seven differ-
ent groups, we recorded no significant differences as a result of the pre-test.
The difference between the most supportive and the least supportive group
is .61. This pattern clearly changes after the post-test. Now the difference
between these two groups is 1.61 and the seven groups differ significantly
from each other. Content obviously increases the polarizing impact of the
mass media. If we compare the variance of the dependent variable explained
by the design used in Table 1 (i.e. controlling only for the evaluative tone of
media reporting, i.e. ‘positive’ or ‘negative’ attributions) with the design in
Table 2 (i.e. controlling for evaluative tone and content simultaneously), it
turns out that the explanatory power of the two models does not substan-
tially differ in the pre-test (η2 = .00 vs. η2 = .04), yet it does in the post-test
(η2 = .11 vs. η2 = .24).
The impact of the mass media on attitudes toward the EU membership
of Macedonia remains significant (p < .05 for democracy, and the effects for
both economy and culture are almost statistically significant)6 once we try to
explain support for EU enlargement in the post-test by including other
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Table 2 Impact of press reports about Macedonia’s economy, democracy and
culture on attitudes towards Macedonian EU membership
Pre-test Post-test Difference p (t-test) N
Economy: positive –.09 .55 .64 < .05 11
Economy: negative .07 –.21 –.29 > .05 14
Democracy: positive –.47 .33 .80 < .01 15
Democracy: negative –.47 –.67 –.20 > .05 15
Culture: positive –.54 –.54 .00 > .05 13
Culture: negative –.44 –1.06 –.63 < .05 16
Control group –.18 –.36 –.18 > .05 11
p (analysis of variance) > .05 < .01 < .01
variables using OLS regression (i.e. support for enlargement in the pre-test,
sex, age, identification with a party represented in the national parliament,
interest in politics, interest in European politics, post-materialism, knowl-
edge about Macedonia, attitudes toward Macedonian citizens, contact with
Macedonian citizens, previous visits to Macedonia; see Table 3). Whereas the
pre-test level of support for Macedonia’s accession to the EU turns out to be
a highly significant determinant of post-test support, no other variable
accounts for the changes in attitudes. After this rigorous test, we can con-
fidently claim that it was exposure to media information that caused the
observed shift in the respondents’ attitudes to further EU enlargement – and
not any accidental differences in the composition of the assigned groups with
regard to demography, political attitudes and values, cognitive and political
involvement, or experiences of Macedonia and its inhabitants.
Exposure to the newspaper articles not only changed the level of support
for Macedonia’s accession to the EU, it also affected Macedonia’s perceived
image (i.e. a consolidated mental conception of Macedonia; see Table 4). As
expected, exposure to news about a particular issue (such as Macedonia’s
economic situation, its democratic performance or its cultural ‘match’ with
the EU) leads, first and foremost, to significant changes in how respondents
evaluate that issue (see numbers in bold).7 For example, focusing on the
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Table 3 Determinants of post-test support for Macedonian EU membership
R2 .40
Article: economy .37 (.18)
Article: democracy .51*** (.26)
Article: culture .35 (.18)
Sex –.15 (.22)
Age .01 (.02)
Strength of party identification –.05 (.06)
Interest in politics –.05 (.14)
Interest in European politics .04 (.15)
Knowledge about Macedonia –.09 (.17)
Sympathy toward Macedonians .07 (.14)
Contact with Macedonians –.34 (.20)
Previous visits to Macedonia –.13 (.26)
Post-materialism –.07 (.22)
Support for Macedonia’s EU accession (pre-test) .48*** (.09)
Constant .00 (.53)
N 94
Note: OLS regression, unstandardized regression coefficients, standard errors in parentheses.
Significance levels: *** p < .01
Macedonian economy provoked an update of the assumption of how the
Macedonian economy performs. In this context, positive articles intensified
positive attitudes and negative articles led to more negative evaluations.
However, these attitude changes resulting from exposure to one particu-
lar newspaper article did not relate only to the specific issue addressed
(economy, democracy or culture); they also significantly affected evaluations
of other aspects of Macedonia’s image (at least partially): evaluations of
Macedonia’s economy, democracy and culture are strongly correlated with
each other.8 The ‘transfer’ of evaluations from one dimension to another often
occurs if negative information is provided. In other words, whereas exposure
to positive information about the Macedonian economy resulted in more
positive evaluations of the performance of the Macedonian economy, but
neither improved evaluations of the state of democracy in Macedonia nor
improved the image of a cultural match between Macedonia and the EU,
exposure to negative information about Macedonia’s economy tended signifi-
cantly to intensify negative evaluations of this dimension as are evaluations
of Macedonian democracy and the cultural ‘match’ issue. How can we
account for this finding? We argue that positive and negative information
about Macedonia is processed in different ways. In the pre-test, we observed
that the participants in our study had stereotypes about Macedonia: on
average, the perceived performance of its economy, its assumed level of
democracy and the perceived cultural ‘match’ were low (economy: –.56;
democracy: –.16; culture: –.33). Hence, negative information provided by the
press reports underscored the negative image of Macedonia. Since individuals
access and cognitively process information that confirms existing stereotypes
more easily than information contradicting these prejudices (see Fiedler and
Bless, 2001), we thus not only identify significant attitude changes for the
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Table 4 Impact of press reports on Macedonia’s image
Article Economy Democracy Culture Min. N
Economy: positive .82** .27 .27 11
Economy: negative –.64 –.50 –.36** 14
Democracy: positive .20 .80*** .33 15
Democracy: negative .07 –.67** –.13 15
Culture: positive .08 .31 .54 13
Culture: negative –.31 –.69** –.69*** 16
Control group –.09 .50 .27 10
Note: Significance levels – ** p < .05, *** p < .01
issue addressed in a particular article, but also witness the reinforcement of
other aspects about Macedonia that are mentally associated with this issue.
In contrast, to process information that contradicts the stereotype (i.e. positive
articles about Macedonia), processing cannot rely on heuristics and is conse-
quently more systematic and elaborated.9 Given the lack of knowledge about
Macedonia, the information provided by a particular newspaper article –
irrespective of whether it is framed positively or negatively – causes respon-
dents to update their perception of a particular aspect of Macedonia. Since
positive information contradicts already existing views on Macedonia and
does not contain convincing arguments forcing subjects to adjust their
attitudes on other aspects of Macedonia, we observe no ‘diffusion effects’ for
positive information, whereas we do for negative information.
If newspaper reports have an impact on Macedonia’s perceived image –
which is particularly pronounced for the issue dimension in question – it seems
plausible that the information received by respondents changes the standards
by which the EU membership of Macedonia is evaluated. In other words, it is
conceivable that the newspaper articles prime attitudes toward a south-eastern
enlargement of the EU. This proposition can be assessed empirically by
comparing the relative importance of the factors explaining support for
Macedonia’s accession to the EU before and after exposure to the respective
articles and by comparing the relative importance of the primed factor 
between the different groups. Alternatively, priming effects can be validated
by demonstrating that the impact of the experimental treatment on support
for Macedonia’s accession to the EU was fully mediated by the respondents’
beliefs about the Macedonian economy, democracy and culture (see Baron and
Kennedy, 1986). We opted for the first route.
The structure of support is straightforward in the pre-test: for all except
the control group, the only significant determinant was our cultural ‘match’
factor (see Table 5). Respondents who perceived the EU and Macedonia to
be culturally ‘close’ showed a significantly higher level of support for
Macedonia’s accession to the EU than respondents who thought the opposite.
In other words, the cultural ‘match’ factor – not instrumental considerations
or issues related to civic or democratic performance – was driving public
attitudes towards the location of the EU’s borders. In contrast, perceptions
of a ‘cultural gap’ between a candidate state and the EU members caused a
rejection of further EU enlargement.
This picture partially changed after exposure to the information provided
in the newspaper articles. Whereas articles emphasizing economic and
cultural aspects display no significant impact on the structure of support,10
we observe priming effects for press reports emphasizing Macedonia’s state
of democracy (t = 2.55, df = 56, p < .05). For respondents who read about
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recent developments in Macedonian democracy, attitudes about the level 
of democracy are now the most important factor explaining support for
Macedonian accession to the EU. In contrast, the impact of evaluations regard-
ing the ‘culture gap’ between Macedonia and the EU is no longer statistically
significant. In addition (and in contrast to the pre-test), the impact of beliefs
about Macedonian democracy in the post-test is significantly stronger for
those respondents who read an article about the state of democracy than for
those who received an article about economic issues (t = 2.15, df = 51, 
p < .05) or cultural issues (t = 3.78, df = 55, p < .01). In contrast, the
structure of support did not change for the control group: in the post-test, as
in the pre-test, none of the three factors is a statistically significant predictor
of support for Macedonia’s accession to the EU.
Discussion
In this contribution, we started by indicating that research on public support
for the EU and European integration in general and for EU enlargement in
particular predominantly refers to two types of explanations: instrumental
economic considerations on the one hand (i.e. the individually perceived costs
and benefits of European integration and EU enlargement), and affective
considerations (i.e. the strengths of citizens’ psychological identification with
their nation-state as well as with the EU) on the other. Since the vast majority
of citizens have no first-hand experience of domestic or European politics, we
contend that they rely on mass media coverage to form their opinions. Un-
fortunately, few studies analyse the influence of mass media reports on 
EU-related attitudes; this is especially true for the research on EU enlarge-
ment. Furthermore, we criticized the fact that media impact studies usually
engage in issue amalgamation by emphasizing either ‘positive’ or ‘negative’
media frames associated with EU enlargement, thereby collapsing different
potentially interesting issues dimensions. Consequently, we suggest a more
fine-grained understanding of the strength of media effects by analytically
separating three different issue dimensions that underlie EU enlargement
support for a given candidate country: its economic performance, its state of
democracy and its perceived cultural ‘match’ with the EU.
Obviously, our data and analysis have several limitations. First, our
sample consisted of university students. We do not know if the media effects
that we observed in this study would also hold for ordinary citizens. In other
words, we cannot make inferences from our sample to any ‘real’ population.
Second, our analysis is based on an experimental study. The advantage here
is, of course, that we can be certain about the causal relationship between
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media reception and attitude change. To demonstrate this relationship was
our central objective. The disadvantage is that experimental studies suffer
from an external validity problem: the reception situation was artificial and
the attention our respondents paid to the article was probably above average.
Again, we cannot be sure if the effects measured here will be replicable in a
more realistic reception situation. Third, we do not know how persistent the
induced media effects are. Fourth, we do not know whether the effects
observed in our study are Germany specific or whether we could potentially
observe country effects by conducting a similar experiment in other EU
member states.
Our results indicate that media coverage has a strong impact on citizens’
attitudes to EU enlargement. By conducting an experiment, we were able to
demonstrate that information on the economic, political or social situation in
a candidate country provided by only a single newspaper article significantly
changes the level of public support for EU accession by this country. Accord-
ing to studies testing the cumulative impact of mass media reports (e.g.
Noelle-Neumann, 1973; see also Peter, 2004), we can assume furthermore that
exposure to a larger number of articles, newscasts, etc. – provided they pull
in the same direction – would further increase changes in support levels. We
demonstrated that positive information about a candidate country generally
causes an increase in support for accession whereas negative information
leads to a decline in support for further EU enlargement.
Furthermore, exposure to newspaper articles on recent democratic
developments in Macedonia shifted the standards by which a candidate
country’s accession to the EU is evaluated (priming). As a consequence, public
support for EU membership no longer depends on cultural aspects but
depends on the perceived level of democracy. Of the three conditions tested,
only the democracy condition displays significant priming effects. One
explanation for the presence of priming in this condition could be related to
sensitivity and prior knowledge about the criteria for EU accession, the so-
called ‘Copenhagen criteria’, among which the ‘political’ criteria play a central
role: the stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law,
human rights and respect for and protection of minorities. Given the media
presence of these issues in the run-up to the 2004 and 2007 enlargement
rounds, it is conceivable that our respondents possessed knowledge about
these criteria that was activated and brought to the ‘top of their heads’ by the
democracy stimulus. But how can we account for the presence of priming
effects in the democracy condition when priming is absent in the economy
and culture conditions? With regard to the culture condition, we have shown
that culture strongly drove attitudes towards Macedonia’s membership in the
pre-test; culture was hence already at the ‘top of the heads’ (Zaller, 1992) of
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our respondents. Given that culture was already an important determinant of
respondents’ attitudes towards Macedonia’s accession, ‘priming’ this aspect
did not significantly amplify its importance in the post-test. The absence of
priming effects in the economic condition can be related to the recent enlarge-
ment round. Since 2004, a large number of rather economically weak Central
and East European countries have joined the EU and, consequently, the
possible negative effects of Macedonian EU membership on the EU and
German economies might be seen as rather negligible by the respondents in
our study. We wish to emphasize that all these explanations are tentative in
nature. Evidently, further research is required to assess whether and how
priming effects vary by choosing different sample populations and by
engaging in cross-national comparisons.
Since the ‘revocation’ of the ‘permissive consensus’ between the political
elites and the European public, public opinion features ever more prominently
in affecting the pace, content and direction of the European integration project.
The negative referendum outcomes in France and the Netherlands on the
European Constitutional Treaty are not the first time that citizens have said
‘No’ to the politics of integration pursued by most of the national and
European political elites. A key to understanding why ideas about and trajec-
tories of the future development of the EU differ between the elites and the
public is the role of the media. We argue that models explaining support for
the EU and European integration should pay more attention to the mass
media. Press, radio, television and the Internet serve as a link between ‘cue-
givers’ at the macro level and ‘cue-recipients’ at the micro level. Unfortunately,
media coverage of the European Union tends to have an increasingly negative
tone (Peter et al., 2003; for content analyses of the German media coverage,
see e.g. Brettschneider and Rettich, 2005). Our experimental results show
unequivocally that media reporting has a remarkable impact on shaping public
attitudes towards further enlargement of the EU and we are rather sceptical
that countries wishing to join the Union will be welcomed by European
citizens. Bearing in mind the media’s evaluative tone and the role of public
opinion in future enlargement rounds, we expect that citizens will give
politicians and their plans for further integration a hard time.
Notes
This research was funded by a grant from the Kaiserslautern University of Tech-
nology. We wish to thank Bernhard Miller, Wolfgang C. Müller and three anony-
mous referees for their helpful comments. We owe particular thanks to
Stefan-Fabian Lutz, Michael Müller and Jens Schmidt for their assistance in organ-
izing the experiment and in collecting the data set.
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1 Of the respondents, 41% were female. The average age was 24.9 years. Party
attachments were distributed as follows: 23% CDU/CSU, 35% SPD, 14%
Green Party, 1% Linkspartei.PDS, 1% ‘other’ party, 26% ‘no party attach-
ment’. In total, we report 36 ‘drop-outs’, i.e. students who participated only
in the pre-test. Checking for social and political differences between respon-
dents who participated in both the pre- and the post-test and ‘drop-outs’,
there is only one significant difference for the distribution of party identifi-
cation (p < .05): in the group of post-test-only respondents, supporters of
the SPD (40%) and the FDP (14%) were slightly overrepresented whereas
supporters of the CDU (20%) and the Green Party (6%) and persons without
party attachment (20%) were slightly underrepresented. Students affiliated
to Linkspartei.PDS as well as to other parties were absent from this group.
This difference should have no consequence for the results of our study
because the German political parties are generally in favour of the European
integration process.
2 The length of each article was approximately 350 words. The heading of each
article was ‘European Union deliberates on South-Eastern enlargement’. The
subheading varied according to the frame, yet it clearly indicated the evalu-
ation of the possible accession of Macedonia to the EU and also provided the
reasoning behind this evaluation (e.g. ‘Support for Macedonia’s possible
accession due to favourable economic structures’). Each article was divided
into four paragraphs. The first paragraph stated that the European Council
would decide whether or not the EU would start accession negotiations with
Macedonia the coming weekend. In addition, the respondents obtained infor-
mation about the position taken by EU member states on this issue, the
Commission’s recommendation and the main reason why the EU was
expected to start or to withhold accession negotiations (i.e. economic
concerns, the level of democracy or cultural aspects). The second paragraph
presented ‘facts’ and ‘statistics’ that bolstered the positioning of the EU. The
third paragraph highlighted the position of the German government (which
is always in line with the position of the EU) and offered some statements by
leading German politicians. In order to prevent the information presented in
the article from being evaluated by partisan or ideological beliefs (‘cues’), 
we cited politicians from different political camps. The final paragraph
emphasized that, if the EU decided to negotiate with Macedonia, the nego-
tiation process might start as early as March 2007 and – in the event of
successful negotiations – Macedonia might join the EU in mid-2008. In order
to minimize the effects of different wording, we held most of the textual infor-
mation constant. As a consequence, ‘positive’ articles differed from ‘negative’
articles only by switching attributes from the positive to the negative (and
vice versa) while the rest of the text remained unchanged, and by slightly
modifying the politicians’ quotations. In addition, we kept the structure, the
basic information provided and the actors mentioned in the different articles
as comparable as possible. To increase the credibility of the articles, we
employed the house style of the Süddeutsche Zeitung, one of the major 
German national quality newspapers. In addition, the source of the article
(newspaper and date) was handwritten in the margin.
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3 ‘Crude carrier instead of pipeline: New terminals, new ships, new providers
– liquid natural gas might become the petroleum of the 21st century’,
Süddeutsche Zeitung, 6 January 2006 (our translation).
4 ‘To what extent do you agree or disagree that the following non-EU countries
should become an EU member: Macedonia?’; five-point scale ranging from
+2 (‘completely agree’) to –2 (‘not agree at all’).
5 ‘What do you think: (a) how congruent is the culture between the EU and
___, (b) how does the economy perform in ___, (c) what is the level of democ-
racy in ___ . . . the following countries: Macedonia’; five-point scales ranging
from +2 (‘completely share our values’/‘the economy performs very well’
/‘high level of democracy’) to –2 (‘do not share our values at all’/‘the
economy performs very poorly’/‘not a democracy at all’).
6 Coding scheme: –1 (‘exposure to negative article on the particular issue’); 
0 (‘exposure to another article, including control group’); +1 (‘exposure to
positive article on the particular issue’).
7 Up to 6% of the sample had missing values either in the pre-test or in the
post-test as regards the evaluation of the Macedonian economy, democracy
and culture. In order to prevent a reduction in the sample size, missing values
in the pre-test were substituted by post-test values and vice versa. This treat-
ment is conservative, i.e. it assumes stability and therefore reduces change
rates and decreases standard deviations. As a consequence, the reported
impact of press reports on attitudes is underestimated.
8 The correlation coefficients are r = .53 (pre-test) and r = .42 (post-test)
between economy and democracy, r = .34 and r = .46 between economy and
culture and r = .48 and r = .57 between democracy and culture. All corre-
lations are statistically significant (p < .01, minimum N = 94).
9 For a discussion of the Heuristic-Systematic Model (HSM) see e.g. Chaiken
et al. (1989).
10 The regression coefficients for the pre-test and the post-test do not yield any
significant differences (economy: t = .03, df = 46, p > .05; culture: t = .06,
df = 54, p > .05).
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